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CHAPTER 5 
Clever or Clueless? 
Observations about Bombing Norm Debates 
CHARLES J. DUNLAP JR. 
For those favorably disposed toward the over-
throw of oppressive regimes occasioned by the momentous events in the 
Arab world of early 2011, the news of the effectiveness of air attacks against 
the forces of a dictator threatening brutality toward his own people is a wel-
come development. In the wake of NATO intervention against the regime 
of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya in March of that year, the New York Times 
cited an example of what allied air power had accomplished. It quoted "a 
rebel spokesman using the name Aiman" who described how government 
tanks and artillery had been firing into the besieged city of Misurata "until 
three waves of airstrikes forced them back. 'After the airstrikes, things have 
been quiet,' he said by telephone."! 
Indeed, the use of aerial bombing in support of what has been called the 
Arab Spring" caused one enthusiastic (overenthusiastic?) analyst to proclaim 
that Operation Odyssey Dawn (the name of the Coalition air operation) 
is providing a "new lease on life for humanitarianism" by vindicating the 
"fragile responsibility-to-protect norm."2 
The Arab Spring generated virtually a tsunami of interdisciplinary discus-
sion about the meaning, effect, and utility of the use of force at the call of 
the United Nations in the furtherance of humanitarian goals.3 Much of that 
inevitably addresses the technology of war, of which airpower is frequently 
seen as the most sophisticated expression. It is imperative, therefore, that the 
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enormous intellectual firepower of the academy be applied to this effort, 
as practitioners too often lack the time or the environment for the kind of 
considered reflection that best produces introspective analysis and thoughtful 
guidance for going forward. 
The purpose of this essay is to attempt to facilitate the potential contribu-
tion of the range of academics, philosophers, theologians, nongovernmental 
organization representatives, and others outside the armed forces and gov-
ernment whose views are vital to this important dialogue. It will seek to 
complement and widen the expertise of discussants by highlighting certain 
technical information about airpower and by presenting something of a mili-
tary perspective. Why? Because in this writer's experience the debate about 
the legal and ethical issues of bombing can become obfuscated when, for 
example, the terms of reference are confused and, especially, the technology 
of modern air warfare is misunderstood. 
To illustrate, sometimes interchanges get bogged down in lengthy polemics 
whose predicates seem to assume that the means and methods of air warfare-
not to mention the doctrine and methodologies for its application-were 
somehow frozen in place circa 1945. In other instances, the interpretation 
of today's bombing norms is too often sourced in popular understandings of 
Cold War deterrence strategies. Reference to Vietnam-era bombing practices 
can likewise become mired in circular discussions of the war's wisdom-a 
discussion that has intrinsic value but that is nevertheless of limited help in 
meeting the challenge of devising contemporary bombing norms. 
It is true that some commentators have delved into more recent conflicts, 
especially those in Iraq and Afghanistan. Typically, the narrative produced 
is disapproving as to the use of the air weapon. Such criticism can be well 
reasoned, insightful, and productive. However, occasionally it is less useful 
than it might have been because the armed forces in general, and the U.S. 
Air Force specifically, too often have done an inadequate job of informing 
the public of relevant factual information. 
Of course, sometimes the hostile reviews are merely an expression of an 
ideological agenda that uses seemingly generic critiques of advanced military 
technology as a stalking horse for further attacks on the real objective-that 
is, the defense policies of the United States. Those who level such attacks are 
not the hoped-for audience of this chapter. 
Rather, this chapter is for those who are open-minded in their views, 
and-in any event-want to ensure that their arguments take into account 
as much factual data as possible and consider the widest set of views. Even if 
one remains convinced of one's own critique after evaluating the informa-
tion and perspective this analysis tries to provide, one can do so with renewed 
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confidence and conviction from having considered and rejected an alterna-
tive presentation. It is the absence of awareness of such alternative views that 
this essay seeks to address. 
Discerning What Really Happened and Happens 
One of the most frustrating aspects of any discussion about legal and ethical 
norms applicable to airpower is the role history plays in the debates. Unfortu-
nately, the conversation is not always as fully informed as it should be. It is true 
that some historical studies about airpower are so technical that they can be 
difficult for those whose expertise lies in another discipline to fully assimilate, 
but there are also readily available sources that are cogent, concise, and easily 
digestible. Perhaps the finest example of the genre is Phillip Meilinger's short 
book Airpower: Myths and Facts, which is available online. 4 Meilinger works to 
dispel many misunderstandings about airpower, including, for example, those 
concerning World War II aerial bombardments. 
Dr. Rebecca Grant's short essay about the much-maligned Kosovo air 
operation is another easily accessible perspective that counters many of the 
misconceptions regarding that campaign. One need not accept her conclu-
sions per se to appreciate that correcting some widely reported factual errors 
(e.g., that no NATO aircraft flew below 15,000 feet)) is important in con-
sidering the legal and ethical norms that were actually observed. 5 Offering 
alternative readings of what is assumed to be the "history" of past bombing 
operations may help illuminate contemporary discourse. 
There are several more extended examples of relatively recent scholarship 
that provide needed perspective for some classic issues of air warfare. For 
example, with reference to the bombing of Dresden-which is frequently 
used as a bumper sticker of sorts to denigrate airpower-historian Freder-
ick Taylor observes that the number of civilian deaths from the strike "still 
wrenches at the heart six decades later" but adds: 
This does not mean that the Allied bombing of Dresden cannot be 
justified. Dresden was not an "open city," but a functioning enemy 
administrative, industrial, and communications center that by February 
1945 lay close to the front line .... The bombing of Dresden was not 
irrational, or pointless-or at least not to those who carried it out, who 
were immersed deep in a war that had already cost tens of millions of 
lives. 6 
Taylor's observation does not make Dresden some kind of recommended 
template for a current approach to bombing. It simply shows that historians 
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continue to argue over these controversies. Some point out, for example, that 
the overall bombing campaign-for all its many faults-did have the effect 
of imposing a huge burden on the Nazis' ability to wage war. Among other 
things, they were obliged to divert "two million people, 55,000 anti-aircraft 
guns [and] 20 percent of all ammunition" to the air defense effort.7 Were it 
not for the allied air offensive, says historian Richard Overy, Nazi "frontline 
troops might have had as much as 50 percent more weaponry and supplies."8 
Nor is this to suggest that bombing should be conducted against an oth-
erwise unlawful target simply to force an adversary to defend it. To the 
contrary, enormous effort was focused-with real success-at disrupting a 
bona fide target (Nazi war industries), and military effects of great impor-
tance were produced by that effort and sacrifice (more airmen were killed 
in the Eighth Air Force in Europe alone than the Marine Corps lost in all 
theaters during the entire war).9 Such information may be useful to offset 
the oft-heard assumption that the World War II air campaign was immaterial 
to the outcome of a war and therefore that all air warfare must be similarly 
ineffective. 
Perhaps the real lesson is that with respect to a highly technological means 
of warfare such as aerial bombardment, the value of historical examples is 
necessarily temporally limited. This may be why airmen tend to look at 
history somewhat differently than perhaps others do. In an otherwise sneer-
ing and bitter denunciation of air force students attending the service's war 
college, academician Daniel J. Hughes has something of a point when he 
accuses the officers of "having little interest in theory and history, which 
they frequently regard as [made] irrelevant by advances in technology and 
military capabilities."10 
Airmen are keenly aware of how dramatically the irrefutable laws of phys-
ics affect their machines; a better machine typically will defeat an opposing 
pilot, however talented, and this shapes an airman's mindset. 11 There is good 
reason for this concern. In 1945, the B-29 Superfortress was regarded as the 
most fearsome air weapon ever built, as it progressively devastated Imperial 
Japan. Yet less than six years later, the propeller-driven bombers were slaugh-
tered in Korea by then state-of-the-art Russian-built MiG jet fighters. 
Technological evolutions, especially those of the past very few years, have 
revolutionized the dynamic of air warfare. Information-age technologies 
have wrought several extraordinary changes, two of which are especially im-
portant to bombing norms: the emergence of precision strikes12 and persistent 
intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (ISR) capabilities. 
Regarding precision weapons, consider that during World War II bombs 
on average would land within perhaps 1,200 feet of their target. Today, to be 
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rated a precision weapon a "munition must hit within three meters, or less 
than ten feet" of the target. 13 These are the kinds of "smart" weapons used 
in contemporary conflicts, not the "dumb" bombs of other conflicts. For 
example, "close to 100 percent of all weapons carried and employed by air-
craft in Afghanistan are of the precision type."14 
Equally or more important is the revolutionary impact of persistent ISR 
enabled by the development of a variety of long-loiter aeronautical ve-
hicles and more powerful sensors. IS Today, ISR platforms can keep some 
battlespaces under near-constant surveillance, and this has significant impli-
cations. For example, USA Today reported that in the air attack that killed 
al-Qaeda operative Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2006, it took "600 hours of 
surveillance by a Predator drone to track Zarqawi and a matter of minutes 
for an F-16 to drop the bombs that killed him."16 In 2008,journalist Mark 
Benjamin reported on the options such technology gives decision makers: 
The Air Force recently watched one man in Iraq for more than five 
weeks, carefully recording his habits-where he lives, works and wor-
ships, and whom he meets .... The military may decide to have such 
a man arrested, or to do nothing at all. Or, at any moment they could 
decide to blow him to smithereens. 17 
Interestingly-and somewhat counterintuitively-overhead surveillance 
can sometimes provide superior situational awareness to that obtained by 
soldiers on the ground. One published report points out, for example, that 
"despite the distance, the real-time video feeds [provided by aircraft] often 
give [remote air controllers] a better vantage point than an Army unit has just 
down the street from a group of insurgents."ls Thus, it is simply inaccurate to 
believe that with today's capabilities civilians are necessarily put more at risk 
by air operations than by ground operations because of a dearth of relevant 
intelligence. 19 
The revolutionary impact of technology is not limited to weapons and 
aircraft; it has also radically changed the process by which operations are 
planned and carried out. In order to harness the potential of the information 
age, the air force has constructed advanced combined air operations centers 
(CAOCs) filled with technologies that facilitate not only that application of 
force but also the observance of legal and ethical norms. For example, US 
News & World Report noted that in the CAOC: 
the center painstakingly plans its strikes, says an officer in the targeting 
team. Analysts calculate the size of bomb fragments and the distance 
they travel from the strike site, using detailed maps and video footage to 
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gauge potential for human casualties and property damage. In another 
area, analysts don 3D glasses to read maps that show precise heights of 
palm trees and the walls of any given compound to help determine 
"collateral concerns." 
Similarly, the New York Times described it this way: 
At the air operations center, targeting specialists spend hours before 
each mission measuring distances from the potential strike zone to the 
nearest house, building, mosque, school or hospital. ... Vast numbers 
of public, religious and historic sites make up a computer database of 
no-strike zones. Special goggles are worn while reviewing digital im-
ages compiled from surveillance aircraft and satellites to give a detailed, 
three-dimensional view of the target area. 
The bombs themselves are chosen carefully and sometimes modi-
fied. Some designed for air burst are instead programmed with a de-
layed fuse to bury themselves before exploding, thus reducing the blast 
range. One sort of bomb has even been loaded with less explosive, 
filled instead with concrete, to cause great damage where it hits but 
no farther. 20 
The Times also noted that air force lawyers vet the targets to ensure that 
the proposed bombing conforms "to a complex body of military law, in-
cluding the Geneva Conventions, acts of Congress and court decisions."21 
Those specially trained lawyers, who are on duty in the CAOC around the 
clock, use a variety of computerized analytical and communication tools to 
conduct sophisticated evaluations of all aspects of the air operation and to 
provide real-time advice as required. 22 
In any event, the result of this blending of law and innovative technolo-
gies is that even a Human Rights Watch analyst was obliged to admit that 
"in their deliberate targeting, the Air Force has all but eliminated civilian 
casualties in Afghanistan."23 Having said all this, asymmetries can arise over 
differences as to what law applies in determining legal and ethical norms. 
Sorting out the Legal Cacophony 
Today those concerned with the legal parameters of aerial bombing and 
with the law of war in general, are presented with a confusing cacophony of 
treaties, declarations, agreements, and protocols, along with claims of binding 
international law that exists only as custom. 24 The situation is further com-
plicated by the fact that the preeminent airpower nation, the United States, 
CLEVER OR CLUELESS? 115 
is not a party to some of the leading international agreements that many (if 
not most) nations have acceded to.2S This can vastly complicate efforts to 
discern applicable legal norms. 
A good example is Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, which contains 
much-discussed rules about the protections of civilians. 26 Even though it is 
not a party to Protocol I, the United States conducts its operations in a way 
that seems to indicate that it accepts the bulk (but not all) of it as customary 
international law. Regrettably, the publication of the U.S. Department of 
Defense's long-awaited Law if War Manual, which was anticipated to elu-
cidate this and many other issues, has not, as of this writing, yet occurred. 27 
Until it does, the best and most widely accepted compilation of existing 
international law applicable to bombing is the HPCR Manual on International 
Law Applicable to Air and Missile Waifare issued by Harvard's Program on 
Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research. 28 Although this Manual is not 
without controversy, it is the product of a six-year effort that included many 
leading international experts from both legal and military disciplines. Nota-
bly, it bills itself as a "restatement" of existing law and emphatically does not 
purport to create any new norms. 
What is remarkable about the slim volume is that it reveals that relatively 
little law is explicitly limited to air and missile warfare. This would suggest 
that air operations should get no more scrutiny-and perhaps less, given the 
relatively small numbers of civilian casualties they cause-than other kinds of 
fires and military operations. Yet they do. James Baker, a former member of 
the U.S. National Security Council, illustrates a common perception: 
Air power is more susceptible to legal and policy adjustment than 
ground combat, in light of the variations in means and method of at-
tack available through variation in munitions, delivery azimuth, angle 
of attack, aim point, fuse, and explosive, all amplified with the assistance 
of computer simulation. 29 
In many respects, what Baker says is true (and this explains why airpower 
can be discreetly applied). However, characterizations like his are also apt to 
create an expectation of perfection that is unattainable with virtually any 
weapon, given the proverbial fog and friction of war. In fairness, it is often 
the military's own actions, such as the distribution of videos showing bombs 
falling precisely down the airshafts of enemy buildings, that exacerbate the 
assumption of infallibility, which in turn distorts discussions of the applica-
tion of force via aerial bombing. 
Misperceptions about the law also create misunderstandings. The St. Pe-
tersburg Declaration of 1868 is an illustration of the mischief that can ensue 
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when the legal applicability of a particular norm is misapprehended.30 The 
United States is one of the nations that were not part of the St. Petersburg 
convocation and it has never agreed to the convocation, which is not, in any 
event, part of customary international law. To the extent that it still retains 
vitality, it binds only nations who are a party to it. 
Of most relevance to this discussion is the Declaration's Preamble. It 
states, in part, that "the only legitimate object which States should endeavor 
to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy; 
that for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number 
of men."3! Scholars often cite this wording to support the premise that the 
purpose of war is simply to kill the opponent's military personnel. Yet the 
"object" of war is not, per se, to "disable the greatest number of men" in 
the adversary's military forces, as some suppose. Rather, as the great military 
theorist Carl von Clausewitz explains, war is "an act of violence to compel 
our opponent to fulfill our will . ... Violence ... is therefore the means; the 
compulsory submission of the enemy to our will is the ultimate object."32 
The destruction of the enemy's military forces is one way of achieving that 
end, but in the view of many strategists, it is an imperfect means of doing 
so. Sun Tzu, for example, argues in his classic The Art of War that "supreme 
excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting."33 
Experience shows that the erosion of the "will" of an adversary through the 
indirect effects of aerial bombardment on civilians is a key element of victory 
in modern war. 34 
The St. Petersburg Declaration also stimulates misunderstandings about 
the status of civilians in war. Contrary to what many may think, the law 
of armed conflict (LOAC) makes no judgment as to the moral culpability 
of individuals in defining that status. Instead, it adjudicates status based on 
certain objective factors-for example, membership in the armed forces of a 
belligerent and, in the case of persons otherwise considered civilians, whether 
they directly participate in hostilities. To the extent they do, they are targe-
table to the same extent as military personnel are.35 
None of this turns on the ideological proclivities-or the absence of the 
same-of any person, combatant or civilian. Under the LOAC, a civilian 
may not be directly targeted-even if he or she embraces the most loathsome, 
odious ideologies and actively promotes the same (short of direct participa-
tion in hostilities). Thus, it is incorrect to indiscriminately apply the label of 
"innocent" to civilians in the context of LOAC Civilians may be guilty of 
any number of moral or even legal breaches yet still e~oy immunity from 
being directly targeted. They are not necessarily, however, morally "innocent" 
civilians. 
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The late Daniel Boorstin, the former librarian of Congress and formidable 
Pulitzer Prize-winning scholar, took this concept a bit further. He insisted 
that Americans in particular suffer from the "Myth of Popular Innocence" 
that is expressed in the "touching American unwillingness to believe ill of 
human majorities."36 Boorstin points out that in reality Hitler, Stalin, and 
Saddam Hussein could not have carried out their evil deeds without the co-
operation of much of the populace. Boorstin adds that civilian societies are 
not helpless victims of unscrupulous leaders, as "history proves that ruthless 
rulers can be removed by popular will."37 In fact, despite having powerful 
internal security forces, the Soviet Union collapsed when confronted with 
a determined people's movement. Much the same can be said of the fall of 
Arab autocrats in the spring of 201l. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that there is no legal or, indeed, moral im-
perative to spare the sentient adult population of a belligerent from the vicis-
situdes of war, short of refraining from direct targeting. To be clear, while 
it is plainly wrong to target civilians or to conduct military operations-
bombing or otherwise-for the "sole or primary purpose of spreading terror 
among the civilian population,"38 it is nevertheless also fully expected-and 
tolerated-that military operations could have psychological and other un-
pleasant consequences for civilians. 
For example, consider the profound sadness of those who have lost a 
family member serving as a soldier in the nation's army. Moreover, even the 
indisputably legitimate destruction of purely military objects can impact the 
civilian population responsible for replacing them. As Dwight Eisenhower 
said, "Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired 
signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, 
those who are cold and not clothed."39 
More specifically, no imperative of law or ethics prohibits the sentient 
adult population from suffering certain indirect costs of war. For example, 
as a matter of law, collateral damage from an air attack "does not include 
inconvenience, irritation, stress, fear or other intangible conditions caused to 
the civilian population."40 Accordingly, while the blockades, "no-fly zones," 
and the destruction of "dual use" infrastructure no doubt impose hardship 
on civilians, it is hardship that is legally and morally permissible. 
Perhaps the most severe penalty civilians must suffer is being killed or 
injured as a result of an attack on a genuine military target. Every legitimate 
military operation seeks to avoid such losses, yet the fact remains that the 
law, properly applied, recognizes that incidental civilian deaths in connection 
with an otherwise bona fide attack on a military target are acceptable and 
often expected. 
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This crucial principle (along with the practical reality that it is typically 
impossible in the midst of military operations to determine which civilians 
are authentically "innocent") illustrates why the notion that combatants are 
legally or morally obliged to take more risk than those holding civilian status 
is so deeply flawed. Apart from the fact that nothing in international law 
imposes such a requirement, simply because a human being chooses to serve 
his or her country in uniform should not be a rationale to value that life less. 
It is wrong to convert an ethic of a disposition toward public service into a 
norm that licenses the devaluation of the lives of those who choose to serve as 
combatants. The life of the civilian-"innocent" or not-is not intrinsically 
more worthy than that of the combatant. 
Another problematic tendency among some well-meaning advocates is the 
unbridled assumption that treaties and other restrictions on specific weaponry 
are an unqualified good. For example, consider the Ottawa Convention's 
prohibition on anti-personnel land mines. 41 The United States-which is not 
a party to the Ottawa Convention-has in its inventory the GATOR mine 
system, an air-deliverable weapon that contains self-neutralizing anti-tank 
and anti-personnel mines. 42 It may be used as a "runway denial" weapon in 
that it can scatter mines on an enemy airfield to make it temporarily unusable 
to hostile forces without actually destroying it. Nations who are parties to the 
Ottawa Convention, however, cannot use the weapon. What is the alterna-
tive for them? Destroy the runway with conventional high-explosives-but 
this will make it unavailable to both postconflict humanitarian relief flights 
and economic reconstitution. 
Many experts are discovering that the well-intended prohibitions on 
chemical and biological weaponry are having the perverse effect of limiting 
nonlethal and low-lethality weapons that might otherwise be developed. 43 
For example, although riot control agents have great potential to limit deaths 
and injury, they are forbidden as a method of war by the chemical weapons 
convention. 44 Such results are garnering criticism. Harvard Law professor Ga-
briella Blum cites the prohibition on the use of riot control agents to question 
the morality of "the law's current absolutist stance [that] prevents parties in 
conflict from lawfully pursuing actions that might lessen the harms of war."45 
Regardless, challenging science to come up with solutions to military 
problems that avoid the law's "current absolutist stance" can take things in a 
direction some may not have expected. For example, as discussed above, it is 
generally unlawful to use nonlethal tear gas as a means or method of war, and 
most countries do not permit the use of anti-personnellandmines. What then, 
are the options left to air operation commanders tasked with such challenges 
as neutralizing the use of caves by enemy forces?46 
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One solution would be to scatter anti-personnel mines around the en-
trances. Since that option is foreclosed to parties of the Ottawa Convention, 
commanders from states that are parties to the Convention may need to 
entomb a cave's occupants by blowing up the entrance-a disconcerting ac-
tion that is not necessarily at odds with international law. Another solution, 
provided by science, is thermobaric weapons. 47 According to one description, 
the thermobaric bomb is "among the most horrific weapons in any army's 
collection ... , a fearsome explosive that sets fire to the air above its target, 
then sucks the oxygen out of anyone unfortunate enough to have lived 
through the initial blast."48 Again, these consequences merely illustrate that 
when the focus of a treaty is on a certain weapon, as opposed to Wects, the 
result can be unintended and a source of concern. 49 
Science does not always produce solutions more troubling than the problem 
it seeks to solve. Consider cluster munitions, another much-maligned-and 
much misunderstood-weapon. They are bombs "that release a number of 
smaller submunitions intended to kill enemy personnel or destroy vehicles" 
in a given area. 50 Because the submunitions contain relatively small explo-
sives, they are very useful in attacking such targets as anti-aircraft guns on a 
dam, snipers on a hospital roof, or even factories producing weapons of mass 
destruction, whose devastation by more powerful explosives might put civil-
ians at greater risk as toxic materials entered the atmosphere. 
Yet today, despite the development of advanced technologies that reduce 
the failure rate of submunitions,51 many nations either prohibit or severely 
limit their use. 52 One way science is helping to address legitimate concerns 
about these weapons is by developing a "newer generation" of cluster bombs 
that are more accurate and "sensor-fuzed submunitions [that] are designed 
to sense and destroy [military] vehicles without creating an extensive hazard 
area of unexploded submunitions."53 
This raises another issue that is inexplicable to some in the armed forces: 
that is, the recent obsession of many academicians with remotely piloted 
aircraft (RPAs)-often inaccurately referred to as "drones." Plainly, RPAs 
are not "autonomous," as some seem to believe, although, as suggested above, 
weapons that "autonomously" sense certain characteristics of targets as they 
home in on them have been in the inventory for decades. 54 There are cer-
tainly legitimate issues about RPA use, but-again-it is not clear why these 
particular systems should be considered differently from other means of using 
force. 55 Some writers seem disturbed that RPAs are operated at a distance, but 
throughout the history of warfare combatants have always sought to apply 
their weaponry from a range beyond their opponents' capability. 56 There is 
nothing in law or ethics that requires a combatant to give an opponent a "fair 
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fight" in the sense of exposing himself or herself to being killed. Indeed, as 
General George Patton succinctly (albeit indelicately) put it "the object of 
war is not to die for your country but to make the other bastard die for his." 
One might rightly argue that regardless of what the law may permit, ethi-
cal norms demand a higher standard. Undoubtedly, there is a clear relation-
ship between law and ethics. According to historian Geoffrey Best, "It must 
never be forgotten that the law of war, wherever it began at all, began mainly 
as a matter of religion and ethics ... It began in ethics and it has kept one 
foot in ethics ever since."57 Nevertheless, few would dispute the idea that law 
typically represents the baseline of consensus about behavioral norms. 
With norms expected to have global application, such as those governing 
armed conflict, it should be clearly understood that seemingly universal prin-
ciples are actually less universal than many believe. This is why, for example, 
the Harvard Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Waifare 
was described above as a "slim volume." In an increasingly globalized world, 
interpretations of ethical norms can vary widely, making consensus rarer. 
Richard Falk is one of many scholars who argue that the proposition that "all 
persons and people aspire to the same human rights" is just factually untrue. 58 
In any event, ethicists and others need to be especially cautious about calling 
upon members of the armed forces to apply ethical norms at variance with the 
law. Service members are not obliged to obey patently illegal orders, but military 
law does provide that "the dictates of a person's conscience, religion, or personal 
philosophy cannot justify or excuse the disobedience of an otherwise lawful 
order."59 Given that there are many different moral philosophies, the dangers of 
allowing personal moral norms to trump the law are readily apparent. 
For example, some conscientious people believe that abortion amounts to 
the murder of an unborn child; the law, however, permits abortions under 
certain circumstances. Thus, force is not permitted to "defend" the unborn. 
Put another way, in the military context uniformed personnel are obliged to 
follow the law in conducting operations, and reliance upon their personal in-
terpretations of international norms is done at their peril. Apart from liability 
for disobedience of orders, even well-meant efforts to "improve" upon the 
law in situations that do not involve the disobedience of orders can still have 
dire consequences for those the law is meant to protect, as is discussed below. 
Airpower in Counterinsurgency 
Until very recently, conventional wisdom was that airpower was either 
largely irrelevant to counterinsurgency (COIN) operations or affirmatively 
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counterproductive. This is the philosophy that seemed to infect Field Man-
ual (FM) 3-24, the much-celebrated publication by, among others, General 
David Petraeus. 60 Published in late 2006, it rapidly became "The Book" on 
COIN.61 From the perspective of the air weapon, it is significant that FM 
3-24 relied heavily upon a study of a rather narrow band of COIN cam-
paigns, mostly from the Cold War era, that largely preceded the information 
revolution that was so influential in the development of precision weaponry 
and persistent ISR. 62 
According to a 2006 RAND study emphasizing those conflicts, "air 
power has been used in a less-visible supporting role" mainly because his-
torically, "insurgencies do not present opportunities for the overwhelming 
application of the air instrument."63 As a matter of fact, given the airpower 
technologies available to those operations of more than a half-century ago, 
it is not especially surprising that airpower was limited to a mainly support-
ing role. 64 
More complicated, particularly in the context of a discussion of aerial 
bombardment, is that FM 3-24 embraced a view of COIN that eschewed 
violence in favor of a "population-centric" strategy65 that sought to win 
hearts and minds66 through nonviolent nation-building and other develop-
mental projects. While not shunning force entirely, FM 3-24 rapidly became 
perceived as advocating a "softer approach that won allies" after it was imple-
mented in Iraq in 2007Y 
In evaluating this "softer approach," it is worth noting that the contribu-
tions to FM 3-24 came from what was called an "odd fraternity" of "repre-
sentatives of human rights nongovernmental organizations and international 
organizations, academic experts, civilian agency representatives, [and] jour-
nalists."68 Among other things, the resulting document called upon a coun-
terinsurgent to serve variously as a "social worker, a civil engineer, a school 
teacher, a nurse, [and] a boy scout."69 Steven ColI described the new doctrine 
this way in the New Yorker: 
[FM 3-24 is popular] among sections of the country's liberal-minded 
intelligentsia. This was warfare for northeastern graduate students-
complex, blended with politics, designed to build countries rather than 
destroy them, and fashioned to minimize violence. It was a doctrine 
with particular appeal to people who would never own a gun. 70 
Unsurprisingly, airpower-especially in its strike role-was marginalized 
into a five-page annex in a nearly 300-page document. And that brief refer-
ence discouraged its use.71 What FM 3-24 did not take into account was the 
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dramatic technological revolution that had taken place in recent years. In the 
fall of 2007, retired army general Barry McCaffrey observed: 
We have already made a 100 year war-fighting leap-ahead with MQ-1 
Predator,72 MQ-9 Reaper,?3 and Global Hawk.74 Now we have loiter 
times in excess of 24 hours, persistent eyes on target, micro-kill with 
Hellfire and 500 lb JDAM bombs,75 synthetic aperture radar, and a host 
of ISR sensors and communications potential that have fundamentally 
changed the nature of warfare.76 
Such capabilities were not overlooked by military commanders-including 
one ofFM 3-24's principal authors. Notwithstanding the "softer" persona of 
FM 3-24, General David Petraeus's COIN operations in Iraq were decidedly 
"hard." Although he publicly derided the notion of "killing and capturing" 
as an avenue to COIN success, that is exactly what happened in Iraq follow-
ing the issuance of FM 3-24. Tens of thousands of Iraqi males were swept 
up and incarcerated in huge detention camps,77 and a dramatic increase in 
"killing"78 complemented the "capturing" that combined to finally bring 
the violence under control. 
Much of the killing of insurgents was accomplished by airpower. Despite 
the admonitions of FM 3-24, airstrikes increased fivefold. 79 The results were 
significant: retired air force lieutenant general Mike Dunn asserts that "90% 
of the terrorists [who were] killed [were] killed by airpower."8o Somehow, it 
seems, this increasing utility of airpower as a COIN weapon got translated 
into an assumption that airpower was a major cause of civilian deaths. 
That was really never the case with Iraq. For example, a 2003 Human 
Rights Watch investigation of major combat operations in Iraq "found that, 
in most cases, aerial bombardment resulted in minimal adverse effects to the 
civilian population."81 A study published in 2009 in the prestigious New 
England Journal of Medicine entitled "Weapons That Kill Civilians" did com-
plain about airstrikes in urban areas but nevertheless produced statistics that 
showed that during the 2003-2008 timeframe in Iraq, only about 6% of civil-
ians who died as a result of the conflict were killed by air weaponry. 82 
There is also little to support the notion that the military success of 2007 
is attributable to FM 3-24's "softer" persona. Even though security increased 
markedly in Iraq in 2007, a 2008 survey ofIraqis found that 61 percent still 
believed that the presence of U.S. forces made security worse in their coun-
try, and of those who thought the security was improved, only 4 percent 
believed U.S. forces deserved the most credit. 83 Notwithstanding the vital 
role of airstrikes and the obvious fact that few hearts and minds were won, 
Iraq is now considered the exemplar of COIN success. 
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Afghanistan reflected a somewhat similar yet different challenge. In 2001 
a unique blend of airpower, small numbers of u.s. special operations forces 
on the ground, and alliances with indigenous opposition forces enabled the 
United States to unseat the Taliban in a matter of weeks. 84 In the ensuing 
years, however, NATO took responsibility, and efforts to prevent Taliban re-
surgence foundered, as did myriad nation-building projects. In 2009, General 
Stanley McChrystal was sent to Afghanistan with a charter to stabilize the 
situation in order to permit a withdrawal of foreign forces. 
During NATO's tenure, its approach to airpower can most charitably be 
described as misguided. In June 2007, NATO announced that there would 
be no airstrikes if it "knew there were civilians nearby."85 In 2008, another 
NATO spokesman declared that no airstrike would take place "if there is the 
likelihood of even one civilian casualty ... not even if we think Osama bin 
Laden is down there."86 The law certainly does not require such extraordi-
nary measures to avoid civilian casualties-and for good reason. 
By replacing the proportionality standard of Protocol I, which permits at-
tacks that cause incidental civilian casualties so long as they are "not excessive 
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated" with a 
"zero casualty" rule, NATO evidently did not seem to comprehend the wis-
dom behind the Protocol's approach. In its approach, NATO telegraphed to 
the insurgents that all they needed to do to protect themselves from air attack 
was to surround themselves with civilians-and that is exactly what they did. 
If NATO had followed the Protocol, the insurgents would not have had as 
much incentive to shield themselves with civilians. 
Unfortunately, General McChrystal's decision in June 2009 to further 
restrict airs trikes proved disastrous for civilians. By June of the year fol-
lowing the implementation of the restrictive rules, Afghan civilian deaths 
had skyrocketed by 31 percent,87 and Coalition military casualties likewise 
rose sharply.88 Importantly, the astonishing increase in civilian deaths was not 
the result of the airstrikes that did take place. A study released in July 2010 
showed that airstrikes were responsible for only a small percentage of the 
casualties caused by Coalition forces. 89 For example, traffic accidents involv-
ing U.S. and Coalition vehicles killed two and a half times as many Afghan 
women and children as did airstrikes. 90 
When General Petraeus replaced General McChrystal in June 2010, he 
vastly increased the use of the air weapon. Noting that airstrikes had risen 
172 percent by October of that year, a journalist accurately declared that 
there was "once again a full-blown air war over Afghanistan."91 General 
Petraeus appears to have grasped the fact that since the vast majority of civil-
ian casualties are caused by insurgents (some 76 percent),92 the best way to 
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protect civilians is to kill those who would kill them. The policy of forgoing 
airs trikes operates to spare insurgents to live to kill civilians. 
Statistics proved the worth of Petraeus's strategies. By the end of 2010, 
he was able to cut the rise in civilian casualties from the 31 percent that had 
occurred under McChrystal's approach to half that rate. 93 Most remarkably, 
a UN report released in March 2011 declared: "Although the number of 
air strikes increased exponentially, the number of civilian casualties from air 
strikes decreased in 2010."94 
Nevertheless, airstrikes are often singled out for the proposition that the 
deaths they cause ipso facto increase insurgent recruitment. Actually, disposi-
tive evidence about insurgent recruitment motivation is scant, and what does 
exist is subject to varying interpretations. For example, that the Taliban kill 
by far the most civilians suggests that they believe that doing so furthers their 
cause in some way. Being Afghans themselves, one would assume they would 
not conduct operations so deadly to civilians otherwise. 
And it appears they may be right. The Christian Science Monitor reports 
that "there is little indication these Taliban indiscretions [causing civilian 
casualties] have backfired on the movement so far."95 Another interesting 
perspective is offered by Afghan expert Jeremy Shapiro. Shapiro believes that 
the Afghan government highlights civilian casualties to get leverage with the 
Coalition, but local officials in his experience "tend actually not to be too 
concerned" with the civilian casualty issue. 96 
Other experts have challenged-convincingly-the notion that RPA strikes 
spur insurgent recruitment. For example, after conducting on-the-ground 
research, analyst Christopher Swift found that such strikes simply do not 
"drive al Qaeda recruiting" in Yemen. 97 With respect to Pakistan, scholars 
Christine Fair, Karl Kaltenthaler, and William Miller challenged conventional 
wisdom in an Atlantic magazine article entitled "You Say Pakistanis All Hate 
the Drone War? Prove It" by arguing that while "drone strikes are not 
very popular among a large section of Pakistani society . . . Pakistanis are 
not united in opposition to drone strikes."98 "In fact," the writers contend, 
"many Pakistanis support the drone strikes."99 
None of this is to suggest that any death is less than a tragedy; rather, 
it is simply to dispute the negative inferences about the military effect of 
unintended civilian casualties that is so often attributed to airpower. In 
truth, a significant amount of scholarship indicates that the physical pres-
ence of foreign forces on the ground is the biggest recruitment stimulant 
for insurgents. COIN expert William R. Polk insists that the "fundamental 
motivation" for insurgents is an "aim primarily to protect the integrity of 
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the native group from foreigners."100 And this has proven true in recent 
conflicts. 101 
In fact, some of the key underlying premises of FM 3-24 are now being 
questioned. Jill Hazelton of Harvard's Belfer Center argues in a recent in-
terview that the "conventional wisdom" of COIN-that "the development 
of healthy, participatory, well-governed states will defeat insurgency"-has 
never actually worked. 102 She contends: 
Generally, states that succeed in COIN rely on the use of force, offen-
sive and defensive, to destroy the insurgent military threat by military 
means, and they also provide limited, targeted political accommo-
dations to gain the cooperation of useful political actors within the 
populace and insurgency. Success in COIN does not require the pro-
tection of the populace, good governance, economic development, 
or winning the allegiance or the loyalty of the great majority of the 
population. It does not require building up all of the institutions of 
the state. These goals may be important to the meeting popular griev-
ances in a particular case, or important to the counterinsurgent for a 
variety of reasons, as with the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
but the empirical evidence does not show that they are necessary for 
success. 103 
Importantly, her research also shows that "successful COIN cases in-
clude less sensitivity to civilian casualties than the conventional wisdom pre-
scribes."104 Along the same lines, Francis J. "Bing" West, former assistant 
secretary of defense for international security affairs and best-selling author, 
notes that although "our senior leaders say the war cannot be won by kill-
ing," the war "will surely be lost if we don't kill more Islamist terrorists and 
hard-core Taliban."105 
West, a former Marine who has just written a new book on Afghanistan, 
sees airpower-as both a high-tech surveillance platform and a precision 
strike weapon-playing a central role in a new strategy that he proposes: 
Push the Afghans to fight their own war. Stop fighting for them. Cre-
ate the Adviser Corps we have needed for the past ten years. Our air 
surveillance is so extraordinary today that we can deploy about 50 advisers per 
400-man Afghan battalion and patrol rigorously without unduly risking our 
advisers. We do not need 100,000 troops .... The Taliban needs to mass 
in order to threaten to retake government control in the urban areas. 
Given our air, they cannot mass. 106 
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Concluding Observations 
As stated at the outset, the potential contribution of the academy to the 
proper interpretation and development of legal and ethical norms associated 
with air warfare is tremendous. The erudition-not to mention sense of 
commitment-of many moral philosophers, theologians, historians, ethicists, 
legal scholars, and many other disciplinary experts is a reservoir of talent that 
needs to be tapped. This is especially so when the means and methods of 
warfare are increasingly complex, especially as related to the air weapon. Better 
ways to use force, especially in sensitive situations such as those posed by recent 
conflicts, can be found if all the information and perspectives are considered 
by the functional experts working in harmony, if not always in agreement. 
Of course, no amount of discussion will impact those whose moral tenets 
reject the concept of the just war. 107 It may surprise some, but those in the 
armed forces-especially those who have seen the horrific consequences of 
war firsthand-are often the ones most opposed to the use of force. Senior 
military officers spend their entire life around young people who comprise 
the vast majority of the armed forces; to them, they are real people who they 
often know in a personal way. And they are acutely aware it is these same 
young people they must send into harm's way and that many of them will 
not return or will return much different than they went. 
Sensitivity to this reality is important. An illustration is the infamous 
incident when UN ambassador Madeleine Albright asked Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell: "What's the point of having 
this superb military you're always talking about if we can't use it?"108 Such 
a casual depersonalization of those who will be expected to go into harm's 
way and, if necessary, pay the ultimate price is deeply offensive to those in 
uniform. As the BBC reports it, General Powell-who it describes as "this 
most military of politicians who has watched men die"-answered Ambas-
sador Albright by icily observing that "American GIs are not toy soldiers to 
be moved around on some global game board."109 Cavalier references to the 
troops-and the risks they take-is dangerous ground. 
There is also a lesson for those ready to ascribe nefarious motives to 
military professionals. Consider the case of Philip Alston, the UN special 
rapporteur who claimed in a study of targeted killings II 0 that because RPA 
operations can be conducted "entirely through computer screens and remote 
audio feed, there is a risk of developing a' PlayStation' mentality to killing."11I 
Of course, no such evidence of that exists. To the contrary, what we do know 
is that those operating these systems take their responsibilities extremely seri-
ously, to the point of suffering psychologically because of it. 
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Dr. Peter Singer, the Brookings Institution researcher who authored the 
book Wired for War, about high-technology weaponry, found that 
in the beginning we feared that drones may make the operators not 
really care about what they're doing. But the opposite has turned out 
to be true. They may almost care too much. We're seeing higher levels 
of combat stress among remote units than among some units in Af-
ghanistan. We found significantly increased fatigue, emotional exhaus-
tion and burnout. Drone operators are more likely to suffer impaired 
domestic relationships, too. 112 
Dr. Singer explained this phenomenon by noting, among other things, 
that a "remote operator sees the target up close, he sees what happens to it 
during the explosion and the aftermath. You're further away physically but 
you see more."I13 His conclusions dovetail with earlier reports in the New 
York Times Magazine about the stresses conscientious RPA operators suffer.114 
As one air force official put it, RPA operations are "a deeply, deeply emo-
tional event. It's not detached. It's not a video game."115 In fact, the New York 
Times reported in early 2013 that RPA pilots suffer stress disorders just as 
those in combat dO. 116 
That Professor Alston would make such a serious accusation without 
offering evidence rightly raises questions about the rest of his analysis and 
conclusions. All of this is yet one more illustration of the importance of 
thoroughly understanding the systems bifore engaging in speculation about 
the motives of the professionals involved. The reality is that academics can 
get their facts wrong. For example, for years many critics of the bombing 
campaign in the 1991 war with Iraq alleged that the destruction of infra-
structure and the subsequent economic sanctions were responsible for the 
deaths of 500,000 Iraqi children. Yet new scholarship convincingly argues 
that this allegation is a myth. 117 
Furthermore, few things frustrate military professionals more than critics 
who do not bother to learn about systems they disparage. With respect to 
RPAs in particular, retired air force lieutenant general David Deptula insists 
that the "truth is, RPA are the most precise means of employing force in a 
way that reduces collateral damage and minimizes casualties" and argues that 
the "critics don't understand the reality of 'drone' operations."118 Deptula 
points out that 
the persistence, situational awareness, and degree of control possible 
with an RPA allows for the immediate suspension oflethal engagement 
if circumstances change or questions emerge-even after a weapon has 
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been released or launched. RPA are networked aircraft and their data 
can reach any spot on earth in less than two seconds. 
Hence, in addition to the hundreds of operational, maintenance, and 
intelligence personnel, many lawyers and senior leadership are directly 
involved with RPA lethal engagements. That kind of oversight is rarely, 
if ever, the case with the use of manned aircraft or with boots on the 
ground or sailors at sea. The power of our intelligence networks al-
lows RPA essentially to carry around their own command and analysis 
center and legal counsel as an integral part of their payload. 
Similarly, the methodology of a much-touted study by Stanford and New 
York University that was critical of RPAs was deconstructed by subsequent 
analysis. ll9 More meticulous studies find that "drone strikes are associated 
with decreases in the number and lethality of militant attacks in the areas 
where strikes are conducted."120 When the "lethality of militant attacks" 
is eroded, innocent civilians benefit. This is especially important given the 
reported decline in civilian casualties from RPA missile attacks. While inci-
dents still occur, the New America Foundation reported in June 2013 that 
only four civilians (as opposed to seventy-eight militants) died in fourteen 
strikes in Pakistan. 121 In any event, one scholar recently concluded: 
In the end, drone strikes remain a necessary instrument of counterter-
rorism. The United States simply cannot tolerate terrorist safe havens 
in remote parts of Pakistan and elsewhere, and drones offer a compara-
tively low-risk way of targeting these areas while minimizing collateral 
damage. 122 
It is also useful for anyone who wants to influence policy to exercise cau-
tion in attacking the motives of military personnel for this reason: doing so 
will not resonate well with the American people. Not that anyone should 
shy away from criticism where criticism is due-which is often the case. But 
notwithstanding periodic scandals and incidents of terrible misconduct, polls 
show that the armed forces as an entity remain the most trusted institution 
in American society. 123 
Such public approval is in stark contrast to that afforded an institution 
such as the UN, which is not held in nearly as high esteem. More particularly, 
military leaders are exceeded only by nurses in the public's positive estimate 
of their honesty and ethics. 124 This may be worth considering when judg-
ing the decisions of military commanders. They often must make difficult 
life-and-death decisions in an extremely compressed time frame and do so 
based on imperfect information produced in the chaos of battle. 
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That is why, for example, international law does not judge command de-
terminations as to what constitutes "excessive" civilian casualties based only 
on knowledge gained in hindsight.!25 Even the u.s. Supreme Court has 
concluded that "it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity 
in which the courts have less competence" than the "complex, subtle, and 
professional decisions" military officers must make. !26 Although penetrating 
analysis of the conduct of military personnel should be made, reticence in 
ascribing mens rea in the first instance could be usefuL 
Finally, no amount of discussion will convince those invested in the be-
lief that force has no place in human affairs. Chinese president Hu Jintao 
recently said that "history has repeatedly proved that the use of force is 
not an answer to problem .... Dialogue and other peaceful means are the 
ultimate solution to problem."!27 This may be so. But what force can do is 
create the space-and incentive-for dialogue by those not otherwise dis-
posed to engage in it. It is becoming increasingly clear to many experts that 
to get terrorist or insurgent groups to "cease their pursuit of an objective 
via armed violence," governments "should focus on the physical attrition of 
such groups as being the primary contribution of force to gaining such a 
policy goaL"!28 
Of course, no use of force is desirable. Yet in the twenty-first century, 
bombing-with all its flaws-is in many instances better than no action at 
all. As one commentator put it, "No one, certainly no one in the US military, 
has ever claimed that a bombing campaign can be carried out without any 
loss of innocent human life. Yet the use of airpower is essential if America 
is to be able to prevail at an acceptable cost of both life and treasure for 
itself."!29 And in the absence of American leadership-and its distinctive air-
power capabilities-one wonders what would have happened to the people 
of Kosovo or, more recently, the people of Libya. 
Indeed, the slaughter in Syria has led to calls for an implementation of 
a no-fly zone.130 While this is doable, it would likely involve a significant 
bombing campaign to suppress Syrian air defenses.!3! Many also fear it could 
draw the United States and its allies into a wider war.!32 It is imperative that 
no one forget the sheer horror and ugliness of war, whether the result of 
bombing or any other use of force. 
As John Stuart Mill famously observed, "war is an ugly thing, but not the 
ugliest of things. The decayed and degraded state of moral and patriotic feel-
ing which thinks that nothing is worth war is much worse."!33 That war may 
be inevitable should spur our efforts to do whatever we can to ameliorate its 
ugliness, and an aggressive, interdisciplinary rethinking of bombing norms is 
a logical endeavor toward that end. 
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It would be a mistake, however, to be overly optimistic. Clausewitz counsels: 
Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious 
way to disarm or defeat the enemy without too much bloodshed, and 
might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it 
sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: war is such a dangerous busi-
ness that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very worst. 134 
That said, there is indisputably a place for hard-headed realism (if not 
"kindness") in the development and application of legal and ethical norms. 
When tied to a genuine understanding of modern weaponry, the strate-
gies for their use, and the people who use them, real progress can be made. 
Achieving that "genuine understanding" does, however, require a serious 
investment of time and intellectual energy by all concerned. 
The stakes are very high as we look ahead. With respect to airpower, futur-
ists George and Meredith Friedman muse that the images of high-technology 
precision weapons striking their targets with extreme accuracy carries a 
"deep moral message," especially "when contrasted with the strategic bom-
bardments of World War II."!35 According to the Friedmans, "War may well 
be a ubiquitous part of the human condition, but war's permanence does 
not necessarily mean that the slaughters of the twentieth century are perma-
nent."136 That is a proposition with which this writer would readily agree. 
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